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Special interest groups play an important role in the
political systems of the developed world. Repeated
accounts of this can be found in economics and polit-
ical science literature, and also among journalists
and policy makers. But measuring the influence of
interest groups is both important and challenging.
There is little consensus among social scientists
about the appropriate definition of “special interest
group”. Some authors use the term broadly for any
subset of voters who have similar socio-demograph-
ic characteristics, or similar beliefs, interests and pol-
icy preferences.1 Others define special interest
groups as organizations that engage in political activ-
ities on behalf of their members. In the following we
will focus on studies that employ the more narrow
definition.
In order to analyze the influence of special interest
groups on public policy making,measures of interest
group influence have to be determined. This has
shown to be a complicated task because there are at
least three distinct problems: the existence of differ-
ent channels of influence,the occurrence of counter-
active lobbying and the fact that influence can be
wielded at different stages of the policy process.The
most basic challenge is to find measures that address
the different channels of influence.This is crucial to
be able to address the impact of different lobbying
tactics on policy outcomes.
In order to promote their political objective, special
interest groups engage in a variety of activities,
which is why there is extensive theoretical literature
on different channels of special interest group influ-
ence. Grossman and Helpman (2001), for example,
give an overview of models that explain the effec-
tiveness of special interest group tactics. They de-
scribe two main channels of influence of special in-
terest groups, the dissemination of information and
campaign contributions.
Interest groups inform policy makers, the public and
their members. The reason for the dissemination of
information is simply to inform and persuade policy
makers of the wisdom of the groups’ position. Spe-
cial interest groups can be an important source of in-
formation for politicians because they are already
familiar with the subject they are promoting and are
willing to undertake research in the area.According
to findings of extensive surveys conducted among
interest groups in the US on the federal level,special
interest groups spend a majority of their resources
on informing policy makers.2
The other main tactic of special interest groups men-
tioned by Grossman and Helpman (2001), which
may be unrelated to the groups’ access to informa-
tion, is the provision of resources to candidates and
parties. Campaign contributions can buy access, cre-
dibility or simply influence for special interest
groups. Of all forms of special interest activity, cam-
paign contributions are the most broadly analyzed
lobbying tactic.
While the theoretical approach to assessing interest
group influence is essential to determine the mecha-
nisms and channels used to exert influence, the evi-
dence from surveys is very helpful to analyze the
actions taken by special interest groups.But in order
to analyze the influence of special interest groups on
public policy making, measurable determinants of
interest group influence are necessary.A first step in
this direction is to register lobbying activity.The pur-
pose of this study is to analyze the status quo of lob-
bying registration in the US and in Europe and to
show how this data has been used to find measurable
determinants of interest group activity.
* Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
1 See for example Putnam (1994).
2 For surveys conducted,see,for instance,Baumgarner et al.(2009);
Nownes and Freeman (1998); Heinz et al. (1993); Schlozman and
Tierney (1986).Lobbying in the US
Registration of lobbying 
Data on all lobbying establishments in the US are
available for recent years, i.e., since the Lobbying
Disclosure Act of 1995 (LDA). The LDA requires
organizations to register and report information on
their special interest activities to the Senate Office of
Public Records (SOPR) every six months.According
to the Act, a lobbyist is any individual who (1) re-
ceives compensation of USD 5,000 or more per six-
month period,or makes expenditures of USD 20,000
or more per six-month period for lobbying, (2) who
makes more than one lobbying contact, and (3) who
spends 20 percent or more of his or her time over a
six-month period on lobbying activities for an orga-
nization or a particular client.According to this def-
inition, two types of registrants are obliged to report
under the LDA, lobbying firms and organizations or
firms that conduct in-house lobbying activities (self-
filing organizations).3 Lobbying
firms are private firms who take
on work for a number of different
corporate and non-corporate cli-
ents. They have to declare their
lobbying revenue. Self-filing orga-
nizations declare (a good faith 
estimate) of their spending on in-
house lobbying efforts.
The following three figures sum-
marize the information on lobby-
ing activity in the US that is avail-
able as a result of the LDA.4 The
data for these figures is drawn
from the Center for Responsive
Politics (CRP),a Washington based
non-profit organization for the
promotion of political transparen-
cy.5 Figure 1 shows how many reg-
istered businesses, labor unions
and other organizations have lobbied the US Con-
gress and federal agencies between 1998 and 2008.
While the number of active lobbyists has increased
only slightly during the last decade, Figure 2 shows
that the lobbying expenditures in the US have more
than doubled during that time.This increase in spend-
ing on lobbying has not been driven by a particular
industry, as shown in Figure 3. This figure also high-
lights which sectors have spent most on lobbying dur-
ing the last decade: the health sector, followed by the
business sector and finance,insurance and real estate.
Contributions from political action committees
Besides spending resources on informing policy
makers, interest groups can give contributions to
campaigns. There are two main types of campaign
contributions, individual contributions and contribu-
tions by Political Action Committees (PACs). Since
individual contributions are made by American citi-
zens, and not by organized groups, we focus on PAC
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3 An example of a private lobby firm is
Van Scoyoc Associates, who represent
some of the largest corporations, as well
as many universities, non-profit organiza-
tions and trade associations in Washing-
ton. Self-filing organizations include cor-
porations such as Wal-Mart, who have
their own lobby shop in Washington, as
well as peak industry groups such as the
American Medical Association.
4 The figures summarize lobbying activity
on the federal level. Each US state has
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contributions here.6 PACs are political committees
organized for the purpose of raising and spending
money to elect and defeat candidates.Most PACs re-
present business, labor or ideological interests. PACs
can give USD 5,000 to a candidate committee per elec-
tion (primary, general or special). They can also give
up to USD 15,000 annually to any national party com-
mittee and USD 5,000 annually to any other PAC.
PACs may receive up to USD 5,000 from any one indi-
vidual, PAC or party committee per calendar year.
Figure 4 shows the PAC contributions between
1998 and 2008 as reported by CRP. Comparing the
PAC contribution with the lobbying expenditures
above shows that a fraction of resources spent by
special interest groups is spent on PAC contribu-
tions. But the same sectors that have the highest
lobbying expenditures spend most on PAC contri-
butions (Figure 5).
Empirical evidence of interest
group influence in the US
In general, studies that incorpo-
rate interest group activities other
than donating to campaigns are
rare. Moreover, there is limited
empirical work linking the theory
to the data.7 The few studies that
assess such influence generally
estimate an equation in which the
dependent variable represents a
decision variable of the public sec-
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6 It is important to note that individual contributions constitute a
large share of campaign contributions and are essential to analyze
the impact of such contributions on election outcomes. See
Stratmann (2005). Data on individual contributions to campaign
can be found at the Federal Election Commission (accessed Octo-
ber 2010).
7 See Potters and Sloof (1995) or de
Figueiredo (2009) for summaries of the
existing literature.tor which the interest group is hypothesized to influ-
ence. Roughly, two sets of dependent variables can be
distinguished.One set concerns the behavior of indi-
vidual political decision makers (i.e.,voting records).
The second set relates to policy outcomes.The LDA
data has been used to analyze how much firms lobby
and how they lobby.8 Furthermore,the data has been
used to quantify the effect of lobbying activities on
policy outcomes in specific industries.9
Evidence from survey data show that a main value
for lobbyists is their proximity to policy makers.10
One important way to establish personal connec-
tions between lobbyists and politicians is to employ
ex-government staffers in the industry or in lobbying
firms, the so-called “revolving door” movement.
Lobbying salaries are typical several times higher
than public sector salaries, which suggests that there
is the opportunity for former officials to cash in on
their government connections.While there is a lot of
anecdotal evidence of this practice, direct empirical
evidence on the extent to which previous officials
are able to convert political contacts in to lobbying
revenue is scarce.11 Blanes i Vidal et al. (2010) con-
ducted one of the few studies that is able to quantify
the value of direct connections between lobbyists
and politicians. They analyze the relationship be-
tween previous government officials and the Con-
gressional politician in whose office they had previ-
ously worked.The authors use data on the lobbying
revenues of these ex-staffers and show how these re-
venues change once their previous employer leaves
the Senate.
The only form of lobbying activity that has been
recorded rigorously for a long time are campaign
contributions. Hence, it is not surprising that PAC
contribution have been extensively analyzed. The
main question concerning PACs is a very sensitive
one: What exactly do they buy? Stratmann (2005)
surveys the existing literature on campaign contribu-
tion and summarizes different hypotheses about the
purpose giving PACs.A main argument in the litera-
ture is that PACs buy influence. If this is the case,
then incumbents who receive money from special
interest groups cater to their wishes because they re-
ceived campaign contributions. Many theoretical
models predict that interest groups buy political
favors with their contributions.12 But the empirical
evidence for this prediction appears mixed.13 Other
possible explanations for Political Action Commit-
tees to contribute to elections could be that, accord-
ing to Stratmann (2005), special interest groups de-
rive consumption value from PACs, or see them as
investments in policy or as a means of gaining access
to the legislator. But while it is relatively straightfor-
ward to examine the influence of PACs on election
outcomes or policy choices, other hypotheses about
the purpose of PACs are not as easily quantifiable.
Lobbying in Europe
Registration of special interest groups
In the US, lobbying regulations, both in the form of
registration and limitations, have been a matter of
concern since World War II.In most European coun-
tries, special interest groups have been analyzed to a
far lesser extent. Chari et al. (2010) give a compre-
hensive assessment of lobbying regulations around
the globe. The term “regulations” for lobbyists, as it
is used by Chari et al. (2010), means that political
systems have established rules which lobby groups
must follow when trying to influence government
officials.The most basic rule is that lobbyists have to
register with the state before contact is made with
public officials.Other lobbying regulations that have
been put into place are that special interest groups
have to indicate which public actors they intend to
influence, that they provide the state with individ-
ual/employer spending records or that there has to
be a publicly available list with lobbyists. Another
registration criterion is if revolving door practices
are openly monitored.
Chari et al.(2010) show that lobbying regulations are
relatively rare in liberal democracies and that the
norm in most countries is that there are no lobbying
rules. See Table 1 for an overview of lobbying regu-
lations in the EU and in the US.In the EU,Germany
is the only country with a long history of lobbying
regulations (since 1951). In Italy, lobbying regula-
tions exist at the regional level.Hungary,Poland and
Lithuania have adopted special interest regulations
after 2000.
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8 See, for example, Schuler et al. (2002) and de Figueirdo and Kim
(2004).
9 See, for example, Schuler (1996) for evidence from the US steel
industry; Hedge and Mowery (2008) for evidence from the biome-
dial industry; and de Figueirdo and Silverman (2006) for lobbying
in the education sector.
10 See, for example, Baumgarnter et al. (2009).
11 See Dal Bo (2006) for a review on regulatory capture.
12 See, for example, Grossman and Helpman (2001).
13 See Stratmann (2005) for details.CESifo DICE Report 4/2010 41
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Contributions to political parties and campaigns
As in the US, campaign contributions are another
way for special interest groups to influence public
policy in European countries. Many governments
regulate from where and how much funding candi-
dates or parties can obtain from private organiza-
tions. The regulations concerning the disclosure of
campaign contributions also differ from country to
country.
Table 2 presents data from the CESifo Database for
Institutional Comparisons in Europe (DICE) on Fi-
nancing of Political Parties. The
Table gives a summary of the po-
litical structure of the countries
and the institutional framework
in which campaign finance takes
place,as well as laws limiting con-
tributions and disclosure require-
ments. This summary shows that
most countries have limitations
to campaign contributions (with
the exception of Austria, Sweden
and the Netherlands). Addition-
ally the source of campaign con-
tributions has to be disclosed in
all countries except in the Nether-
lands.But there is no reliable data
source on campaign contributions
in any of the countries mentioned
in Table 2.14
Registration of lobbying in the
European Union
Besides the obvious lack of data
on lobbying activity in European
countries, there is another issue
that makes the analysis of the in-
fluence of special interest groups
within European countries almost
impossible:the Europeanization of
interest group activity.
Today, many laws and regulations
concerning European Union (EU)
member countries originate in
Brussels. Töller (2010) estimates
that 40 to 80 percent of German
laws passed between 2002 and
2005 are at least influenced by
European impulse.15 With this
shift in political power from national governments to
EU institutions, one would expect interest groups to
change their focus of attention towards Brussels. In
the words of Mazey and Richardson (2006), one
would expect interest groups to “shoot where the
Table 1 
Lobbying regulations in EU countries and in EU institutions
Country/
Institution Rules governing lobbyists as of 2009 
Austria No statutory rules 
Belgium No statutory rules
Denmark No statutory rules  
Estonia No statutory rules 
France Indicated its aim to introduce a voluntary parliamen-
tary run register – July 2009.
Germany Regulation and registration through rules of procedure
introduced by the Bundestag in 1951; later amended in
1975 and 1980.
Hungary  Regulation of lobbying activity since 2006.
Latvia No statutory rules 
Lithuania  Regulation since 2001.
Luxembourg No  statutory  rules
Ireland No statutory rules 
Italy  No statutory rules at national level. Nevertheless, re-
gional schemes have been introduced in the Consiglio
regionale della Toscana in 2002 and Regione in 2004.
Malta No statutory rules 
Netherlands No statutory rules 
Poland Regulations since 2005 
Portugal No statutory rules 
Romania No statutory rules 
Slovakia No statutory rules  
Slovenia No statutory rules  
Spain No statutory rules  
Sweden No statutory rules
United Kingdom  No statutory rules in either Commons or House of Lords.
EU: European
Parliament
Regulated by Rule 9(2) of the Rules of Procedure,
1996.
EU: Commission Before 2008, “self-regulation” was the model adopted
by the Commission. However, as of 23 June, 2008, the 
Commission opened a voluntary register of interest 
representations.
EU: Council No statutory rules 
 Source: Chari et al. (2010).
14 A caveat of the data presented in Table 2 is that it relates mainly
to the year 2000. Hence, even though the main regulations have
remained in place, the data collection process might have changed
since then.
15 Töller (2010) finds that the degree of Brussel’s influence on
German laws varies across fields and that 40 percent of the new
laws in the fields of economics and transportation are at least influ-
enced by decisions made in Brussels. These shares are higher in
finance (42.6 percent), justice (42.2 percent), family and health
(42.3 percent), agriculture (75 percent) and environmental policy
(81.3 percent).CESifo DICE Report 4/2010 42
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Table 2 
Contributions topolitical parties 
Restrictions Transparency
Austria No limits on individual or corporate donations. No
limits on expenditure. Political donations by interest
groups are subject to an income tax surcharge to be
paid by the recipient party. Donations in excess of
EUR 7,730 must be disclosed (total amounts and type
of donor, i.e., individual, interest group, corporation).
States do not require strict reporting and data
provided by parties on the federal level
thought to be incomprehensive for it covers
only part of the parties’ activities and financial
dimensions.
France No foreign donations. No donations from private or
public-sector companies (since 1995). Individual
donations may not exceed ca. EUR 7,575 per year
and donations of more than ca. EUR 150 must be
given by cheque, thereby disclosing the identity of
the donor.
Legal status of parties is vague; data protected 
and not released to the public due to the
constitutional freedom of action granted to
parties. Available reports are incomplete:
expenses for local activities are not detailed
and links between parties and foundations
remain unclear. Poor level of supervision by
regulating authorities.
Germany No limits on individual or corporate donations. Ban 
on tax benefits for corporate donors imposed by the
Federal Constitutional Court. Donations in excess of
ca. EUR 10,300 must be disclosed (names, addres-
ses, and amounts). Ban of foreign donations except
from EU citizens and EU corporations. No donations
in excess of EUR 500 from anonymous individuals.
Reports and lists of donors are published in
parliament material (Bundestagsdrucksache).
Reports have a common format and are well
documented. The total revenue of assessments




Italy No limits on individual or corporate donations for
routine activities (donations to candidates are limited
to EUR 8,700). Donations by privately run business-
ses must be approved by its board of directors and 
disclosed in the company’s annual report. No dona-
tions from public or semi-public entities. Donations in
excess ofca. EUR 2,640 must be disclosed by party
and donor.
Reports are published in Gazzetta Ufficiale, the
official publication for laws and decrees. Re-
ports contain few details: donors are not dis-
closed and income is only in itemized total 
amounts of money (i.e. membership fees,
donations and public subsidies). Political rou-
tine has often not followed disclosure rules.
Netherlands No common format for financial reports. “Dutch
legislators are still rather inexperienced with
regulation on the transparency of political
finance.” Nassmacher (IDEA Handbook).
Portugal No donations from public or semi-public entities or
from foreign governments and institutions. Private 
corporate donations limited to 1,000 monthly minimum
wages, with a limit of 100 monthly wages per contribu-
tor. Private individual donations limited to 30 monthly
minimum wages per contributor; annual total may not
exceed 500 monthly minimum wages. Donations in
excess of 10 times the monthly wage must be made by
cheque, thereby disclosing the identity of the donor.
Reports are published in Diario da Republica. 
Unreliable data; although provided with ac-
count information, the Tribunal Constitucional
has no authority to verify or investigate finan-
cial statements and transactions.
Spain No donations from public or semi-public entities or
from foreign governments and institutions. No limit
on total amount of income from private donations (the
total of anonymous donations may not exceed 5% of
total income); private donations must be disclosed 
(name, address, and ID number). Private individual
donations limited to ca. EUR 60,120 per year (est.
1987).
Reports are published in Boletin Oficial del 
Estado. Unreliable data; although provided
with account information, the Tribunal de
Cuentas has no authority to verify or investi-
gate financial statements and transactions. In
addition, disclosure is not strictly regulated or
enforced: in recent years, accounts have gone
unpublished.
Sweden No formal limits on individual or corporate donations.
No limits or regulation on expenditure or on the use
of public subsidies. Although corporate donations are
permitted and parties are not obliged to disclose in-
formation about donors, parties have voluntarily
agreed not to accept corporate donations and to dis-
close donations from private organizations (amount
and name). Under the agreement, individual dona-
tions are also disclosed, but only total income and 
number of donors must be reported.
No officially published reports; data on income
and spending protected by a traditional privi-
lege of privacy and different bookkeeping
systems by the parties. Only data concerning
public subsidies is reliable.
United King-
dom
No foreign donations. Limits on expenditure. No paid
broadcast advertising. Donations in excess of EUR
8,210 (GBP 5,000) must be disclosed. No donations
in excess of GBP from anonymous individuals or
blind trusts.
Note: This table is a condensed version of a table in the DICE Database: www.cesifo.de/DICE
Main Source: Nassmacher (2001). Other sources consulted: Baran (2000) and Nassmacher (2003). The information
relates mainly to 2000. Compilation: CESifo.CESifo DICE Report 4/2010 43
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ducks are”. This is why Coen describes this shift in
interest group attention as the “Europeanization of
interest groups”.16 The groups active in EU politics
represent a large variety of interests, from countries
within and outside of Europe. Hence, in order to
measure the influence of lobby groups on political
economic decision making processes in the EU
countries as well as in Europe as a whole,it is impor-
tant to understand the impact of special interest
groups on decisions made in Brussels.
In contrast to the US,EU scholars have not had access
to a single,systematic source of data on lobbying activ-
ities in the form of lobbying registration.Furthermore,
the current absence of a comprehensive registration
system in the EU makes it impossible to identify the
universe of the lobbying community in Brussels.
Available data on EU lobbying activities come from
the European Parliament, the EU Commission and
from Landmarks’ commercial register.
In 1996, the European Parliament (EP) adopted a
mandatory system of lobbyist registration. The EP
accreditation registers all groups and their represen-
tatives that obtained the EP’s special entry pass,
which is needed for lobbyists to access the EP build-
ing and to interact with members of the EP. But the
only information available from the interest groups
active in the EP is the name of the organization.
In 2008, the European commission adopted a vol-
untary system of lobbyist registration which was
initiated by the European Transparency Initiative.
As a result, the CONECCS database (Consultation,
European Commission and Civil Society) was re-
placed with the new Register of Interest Repre-
sentatives. The former CONECCS database lists
groups participating in commission committees or
hearings on a voluntary basis.The aim of this data-
base was to make the commission more transpar-
ent, to function as a venue for interest groups and
to help the commission to find the appropriate mix
of partners. The Register of Interest Representa-
tives is continuing the data collection of CONECCS
and requires additional information from the inter-
est groups that choose to register. For example, in-
house lobbyists who want to be listed in the regis-
ter have to disclose their estimated lobbying
expenditures per year in ranges of EUR 50,000,
and lobbying firms have to disclose their annual
income in ranges of EUR 50,000. Interest groups
that choose to register also declare their compli-
ance to an ethics code.
Another data source available to study interest
group activity in the EU is Landmarks’ European
Public Affairs Directory. This is a commercial regis-
ter of groups, firms, national and international insti-
tutions as well as regional actors active in EU poli-
tics in Brussels.
Berkhout and Lowery (2008) have compared these
different datasets and found that there is surprising-
ly little overlap.Baumgartner et al.(2010) have com-
bined the data from CONECCS (now Register of
Interest Representatives), the EP’s accreditation
register and Landmarks’ European Public Affairs
Directory. With the EU Interest Group Population
Dataset 2007–2008, they have created the most in-
clusive and accurate list of lobbying organizations in
the EU yet compiled.17 But this new data set only
lists lobbying organizations, without providing any
information about the number of lobbyists working
for each organization and without disclosing lobby-
ing expenses of the organizations listed. Table 3
shows the size of the disaggregated data sets used by
Baumgartner et al. (2010).
It has been observed in earlier analyses of interest
group populations in various national systems that
professional associations and corporations, i.e.,
16 Coen (2007) talks about “the Europeanization of interest
groups”.
Table 3 







EP accreditation register 1,534 
Total groups listed in any of the
three sources
4,805 
Minus duplicates –1,105 
Final Dataset 3,700 
a) Landmarks' directory lists organizations in different
categories (trade organizations, professional organiza-
tions, etc.). Some organizations are listed in more than
one category. The figure 2,522 in the table refers to
the number of unique organizations listed, after delet-
ing duplicates.
Source: Baumgartner et al. (2010).
17 According to Baumgarner et al. (2010), the full dataset will be
made freely available at http://sites.maxwell.syr.edu/ecpr/intereurogroups representing business interests, provide the
largest share of groups mobilized for political ac-
tion. Table 4 shows that the EU is no exception to
this trend. The Table gives an overview of the type
of organizations that are registered to lobby in the
EU.50 percent of the groups mobilized for political
action are professional associations and interest
groups. Combing the categories associated with
business interests (e.g.,all those except internation-
al organizations, regions, think tanks, political par-
ties and other) shows that 82.5 percent of the lob-
bying organizations in the EU come from the busi-
ness sector.
Analyzing the origins of the special interest groups
active in the EU shows that representatives from
large member states dominate the scene (Table 5).
43.7 percent of all registered special interest
groups are based in Germany, France or the UK.
The Benelux groups benefit from their geographi-
cal proximity to the EU capital Brussels.With 14.7
percent of all registered special interest groups in
the EU, these countries are overrepresented given
their relative size. Organizations from Eastern
Europe so far seem hesitant to enter the Brussels
scene. Only 4.5 percent of organizations registered
to lobby in the EU are from new EU states.
Empirical evidence of special interest group activity
in Europe
Most economic studies that explain the impact of
lobbying activities are based on evidence from the
US. This is not surprising since the registration of
lobbyists is most transparent in the US. But even in
the US, empirical evidence on the impact of special
interest groups on public policy is scarce.
In Europe, data on special interest group activity is
simply non-existent in many countries.This explains
why there is hardly any empirical evidence on the
impact of special interest groups. Coen (2007) sum-
marizes the empirical and theoretical studies on
interest groups influence in the EU. He notes that
there is an increasing amount of theoretical litera-
ture explaining the Europeanization of interest
CESifo DICE Report 4/2010 44
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Table 4 






1. Professional associations and 
interest groups
1,847 49.9
2. Corporations 492 13.3 
3. Chamber of Commerce 36 1.0 
4. Consultants 219 5.9 
5. National employers' feder-
ations
58 1.6 
6. International organizations 118 3.2 
7. Law firms 124 3.4 
8. National trade and professional
organizations
252 6.8 
9. Regions (incl. municipalities) 267 7.2 
10. Think tanks and training 146 4.0 
11. Labor unions 30 0.8 
12. National associations of
Chambers of Commerce
27 0.7 
13. Political parties* 7 0.2 
14. Other 7 0.2 
Missing 70 1.9 
Total 3,700 100.1
* Not a Landmarks' category.
Source: Baumgartner et al. (2010).
Table 5 
Country of origin of organizations registered to lobby
in the EU
A. EU–15 states Frequency Percent
Germany 380  18.7 
United Kingdom 285  14.0 
France 274  13.4 
Netherlands 150  7.4 
Italy 139  6.8 
Belgium 120  5.9 
Spain 75  3.7 
Austria 54  2.7 
Sweden 41  2.0 
Denmark 42  2.0 
Finland 18  0.9 
Portugal 15  0.7 
Luxembourg 13  0.6 
Ireland 13  0.6 
Greece 5  0.3 
B. New EU–27 states
Poland 28  1.4 
Czech Republic 16  0.8 
Slovakia 12  0.6 
Hungary 11  0.5 
Romania 7  0.3 
Latvia 4  0.2 
Estonia 4  0.2 
Lithuania 2  0.1 
Slovenia 3  0.2 
Cyprus 2  0.1 
Malta 2  0.1 
Bulgaria 2  0.1 
C. Selected non–EU states
USA 181  8.9 
Switzerland 75  3.7 
Note: The table lists the nation of origin for those organ-
izations that report it. For non–EU states, we include 
only the two prominent home countries.
 Source: Baumgartner et al. (2010).CESifo DICE Report 4/2010 45
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groups. Most studies concerned with the impact of
special interest groups tackle similar methodological
and theoretical questions as their counterparts in the
US. However, Woll (2006) warns, for example, that
before the replication of US models becomes the
norm in Europe, it is important to investigate how
applicable these concepts are to the EU public poli-
cy process and distinct EU institutions as well as to
the national political systems in Europe. And while
recognizing that Europeanization has occurred, it
must not be forgotten that not all interest groups
make use of the new EU opportunities and distinct
national interest groups remain.18
The challenge
Measuring the influence of interest groups is both
important and challenging. Dür (2008) quotes
Loomis (1983), who describes the attempt of mea-
suring lobbying activity as “searching for a black cat
in the coal bin at midnight”.Baumgartner and Leech
(1998) describe research on special interest groups
as an area of “confusion” in the literature.
In order to assess the impact of interest groups it is
crucial to know who exerts influence. As this study
shows this in itself is a major challenge, since lobby-
ing regulations are non-existent in many European
countries.
Hence,a first step towards being able to measure the
influence of special interest groups in Europe would
be to register lobbyists and disclose their expendi-
tures related to lobbying activities. In the EU, the
EU Interest Group Population Dataset 2007–2008 is
a first step in this direction. So is the European
Transparency Initiative (EIT), which obtained the
disclosure of lobbying expenditures for the interest
groups who voluntarily register as lobbyists at the
European Commission. But while registering lobby-
ing activities at the EU level is important,it does not
replace the need for lobbying regulations in the EU
countries.
The disclosure of contributions to political parties
and campaigns would be another important step
towards more transparency of interest groups activi-
ties in Europe. Such data is available in most EU
countries. But there is no equivalent to the US orga-
nizations – the Center for Responsive Politics or the
Federal Election Commission – to publish the avail-
able records on campaign contributions.
In the literature concerned with the influence of spe-
cial interest groups, the practice of revolving door
lobbying is getting more and more attention. This
practice is widespread in European countries and in
the EU. Hence, the disclosure of former politicians
who move on to the private sector would be neces-
sary to address the impact of this practice.
The most elaborate analysis of interest group influ-
ence has been conducted in the US. One reason for
this is certainly a political environment that makes it
necessary to investigate who pulls which strings in
politics.19 Another reason is the availability of data.
But even in the US, empirical determinants of spe-
cial interest group influence are scarce. The prob-
lems are that there are not only different channels of
influence. Interest groups also affect each other,
which has to be taken into account when measuring
their impact on public policy. Furthermore, interest
group influence can be wielded at different stages of
the policy process and depends crucially on the polit-
ical environment the interest group operates in.
But the recent changes in the rules on lobbying reg-
istration in the developed world are a step in the
right direction. Even though the question of interest
group influence is difficult to analyze, not only be-
cause of a lack of data, but also because of the many
facets of the issue, it is too important to ignore.
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